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Alston's Parity Thesis 
A version of the parity thesis is clearly seen in Alston's work. 
His strategy in some seminal essays is to embed the justification of 
beliefs in the rationality of what he calls "epistemic (or doxastic) 
practices. "1 He then argues that the kind of ju stification available 
for the practice that provides u s  with beliefs abou t  the physical 
world is the same kind of ju stifi cation available for the practice that 
generates beliefs abou t God. He further argues that the level or 
strength of justification is the same. My goal in the present chapter 
is twofold. First, I lay out the central tenets ofAlston's argu ment 
in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " supplementing 
them with some claims made in two other essays and in Perceiving 
God. Second, I provide the outline of a challenge to Alston' s posi­
tion. Although a fuller and more developed accou nt of this chal­
lenge is defended in Chapter 3, I suggest here that if the challenge 
is su ccessful, it calls for some distinctions within Alston's account 
of epistemic ju stification. These distinctions raise some questions 
abou t Alston's version of the parity thesis. 
1. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and "Religious Ex­
perience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (1982): 3-14. Of the two listed here, I 
concentrate mostly on the first. 
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I. Epistemic Pra ctices a nd Bel iefs 
In "Christian Exper ience and Christia n  Bel ief' Alston introduces 
the notion of an epistemic pra ctice. An epistemic pra ctice, he says, 
is "a more-or-less r egular and fixed procedure  of for ming bel iefs 
under certain conditions, where the content of the belief is some 
more-or-less determinate function of the conditions. "2 The notion 
of a practice is more basic than  the notion of a bel ief insofar as one 
considers epistemic status. If one can show that a pra ctice is justi­
fied (or tha t one' s engaging in a pra ctice is justified), then (typ­
ically) by extension its del iverances are justified. So Alston' s central 
concern is whether we are epistemically justified in engaging in 
certain epistemic practices. 
He has two practices in mind. The fir st provides us with (ma ny 
of our) bel iefs about the physical world; Alston call s this "per cep­
tual practice" (PP) or "sense perceptual practice" (SPP or SP). 3 The 
second provides (some of) us with beliefs about God; he call s it 
"Christian practice" (CP) and la ter introduces the notions of "mys­
tical practice (MP) and "Christia n  mystical practice" (CMP). 4 
2. Epistemic Justifica tion 
Alston claims that CP and PP have the sa me kind of epistemic 
justification. What kind of epistemic justifica tion do they have? He 
distinguishes two. Ther e  is an evaluative sense of justifica tion, Je· 
Here the concern is that one' s hol ding of a bel ief be l egitimate vis­
a-vis the concer n for attaining truth and avoiding falsity; the con­
cerns are those of what Alston call s the epistemic point of view. If 
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 110. I use "epistemic 
practice" and "doxastic practice" interchangeably. 
J. He uses PP, SPP, and SP to refer to this practice. I prefer the first, but I use 
the other abbreviations when they are more natural in quoting certain essays. The 
reason for Alston's shift from PP to SPP or SP is that he later develops arguments 
to the conclusion that one can perceive God, or at least that there is no reason to 
think one cannot. Once having broadened the category of perception to include 
access to God, Alston needed a more specific terminology by which to pick out the 
perception of physical objects. The fullest treatment of the possibility of the per­
ception of God is in Perceiving God. 
4· Again the shift in terminology is at least partly because of Alston's need for 
further specificity. The later two terms are introduced in Perceiving God. I use CP 
unless another term is needed for ease of exposition. 
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one is justified in holding a belief in this sense, then the circum­
stances in which the bel ief are held are such that the bel ief is at least 
l ikely  to be true. Alston admits that there is much work to be done 
in discovering what the var ious con ditions for Je are. But when 
that work is done, he says, what Je boils  down to is a kind of 
rel iabil ist un derstanding of ration ality: a belief is Je when it was 
formed or is sustained by an epistemic practice that can be gen er­
ally rel ied on to produce true rather than false bel iefs. 5 
Je is to be contrasted with a normative understan ding of justifica­
tion , ]m which is normative in that it deals with how well a person 
does in l ight of the norms required of us simply in virtue of bein g 
cognitive beings. We have, in short, some obl igations  and duties 
with respect to bel ief an d bel ief for mation because of the fact that 
we are seekers of truth. Jn and Je can be contrasted in this way. 
Consider a naive member of an isolated primitive tribe who, along 
with his fellows, unhesitatingly accepts the traditions of the tribe. 
That is, he believes that p wherever the traditions of the tribe, as 
recited by the elders, include the assertion that p. He is ]n in doing 
so, for he has no reason whatsoever to doubt these traditions. Ev­
ery one he knows accepts them without question, and they do not 
conflict with anything else he believes. And yet, let us suppose, this 
is not a reliable procedure of belief formation; and so he is not ]c in 
engaging in it. Conversely, a procedure may be in fact reliable, 
though I have strong reasons for regarding it as unreliable an d so 
would not be ]n in engaging in it; to do so would be to ignore those 
reasons and so would be a violation of an intellectual obligation. • 
There is, then, a clear difference between Jn and Je· 
A further distin ction within the normative con cept of justifica­
tion runs r oughly parall el to the two positions taken in the William 
James-W. K. Clifford debate on the ethics of bel ief. Since our goal 
as epistemic beings is to seek the truth, Cl ifford demands that one 
ought not hold a bel ief unless one has adequate reasons  for so do­
ing. James denies this claim, suggesting that one can hold a bel ief 
5· A fuller account of evaluative justification is available in Alston, "Concepts 
of Epistemic Justification," and "An Internalist Externalism," in Epistemic Justifica­
tion (the latter originally in Synthese 74 [I988): 265-83). I return to these essays in 
Chapter 4· 
6. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. I I 5· 
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unless one has some reason not to hold it. In effect, Cl ifford de­
mands that we avoid as much error as possibl e, whereas James 
affirms the search for as much truth as possibl e. These parallel a 
strong version Gns) and a weak version Gnw) of normative justifica­
tion. The strong version has it that one is justified in engaging in a 
practice if and onl y  if one has reasons for thinking the practice 
rel iabl e. On the weak version, one is justified in engaging in a 
practice when there are no reasons for regarding the practice as 
unrel iabl e. Some important relationships hold among Je, ]ns• and 
Jnw· Perhaps the most important of these is that if one sets out to 
discover whether a belief or practice is Je then one is setting out to 
discover whether one could  be Jns in holding that bel ief or engag­
ing in that practice. 
Alston makes two central claims. First, one is never Jns in engag­
ing in either PP or CP because one cannot have adequate reasons 
for supposing either practice to be Je· (It does not follow that one 
or the other cannot be Je but only  that one has no adequate reasons 
to think it is. ) Second, both PP and CP can be Jnw for a person. 
The answer to the question with which this section began-what 
kind of epistemic justification do PP and CP share? -is, then, that 
CP and PP share Jnw· Alston' s version of the parity �hesis might 
thus be described: 
Parity Thesis Alston (PTA): Under appropriate conditions, 
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jnw· 
There is a natural extension to bel iefs: 
Under appropriate conditions, both S's bel ief that p, 
where p is a theistic bel ief, and S's bel ief that p*, where 
p* is a perceptual bel ief, are Jnw· 7 
7· This extension, although tacit in Alston's suggestions in "Christian Experi­
ence and Christian Belief," is perhaps incautious. Alston argues elsewhere that one 
must be careful not to confuse levels when dealing with epistemological concerns; 
what applies at one level may not at another. Although he writes in his earlier 
essays that a belief is justified if and only if the practice that generates it is, as his 
ideas develop it becomes clear that, although it may be rational for someone to 
engage in a practice, that in itself does not entail that the beliefs generated by the 
practice are justified. Rationality entails neither justification nor reliability. Alston 
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Alston does not intend his claims to be weak-kneed. First, PP 
and CP have the same level (weak) and kind (normative) of justi­
fication, and al though either CP or PP may be Je one cannot have 
adequate reasons to think either is. 8 Second, he aims his sights 
higher than simple epistemic neutral ity for PP and CP. His general 
goal is to consider the "possibil ity that one' s experience can pro­
vide justification sufficient for rational acceptance. "9 Thus, al­
though both PP and CP are epistemically permissible practices, this 
kind of justification is intended to be understood as sufficient for · 
some sort of positive epistemic status. Epistemic permission to en­
gage in a practice and, by extension, to hold beliefs thereby del ivered 
is sufficient for epistemic acceptance of the delivered bel iefs, even 
though one has no adequate reasons to take the practice to be Je· 
3· The Justification of Perceptual Practice 
Alston describes the basic accounts phil osophers have given in 
trying to show that PP is Je· He does not discuss any of these in 
detail but notes their general failure to win the phil osophical day. 10 
Thus, the prospect of PP being Jns is not good. Furthermore, he 
argues, in a later essay I discuss in Chapter 4, that if one practice can be shown to 
be reliable they all can. Justification is easily had for just about any practice and 
hence just about any belief Alston therefore shifts the question he asks about prac­
tices away from the issue of justification to the issue of their rationality. This shift 
allows him to evaluate the relative strength of our doxastic practices. It turns out, 
then, that engaging in an epistemic practice should be evaluated in terms of ratio­
nality and not justification, and thus some important questions need to be raised 
about the "natural" extension suggested above or, perhaps better, about PTA itself. 
To begin with, is it appropriate or worthwhile to speak of the justification of 
practices (as opposed to beliefs)? Should we not rather speak of the rationality of 
practices? And what does this mean for beliefs? 
8. Perhaps PTA should include a clause noting that CP and PP share at least ]nw 
in order to recognize that they both might be Jc· But Alston seems to suggest in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belie£'' that our knowledge that an epistemic 
practice is Jc is limited and therefore that the strongest claim we can legitimately 
make is that CP and PP are ]nw· See Chapter 4 for an explanation of Alston's 
apparent change of mind on this matter. 
9· Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II 1. 
10. There is a fuller discussion in Perceiving God and an even fuller discussion in 
Alston's forthcoming book on general epistemology (the latter of which is noted in 
Perceiving God). 
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suggests that as far as he knows no one has come up with any 
good reasons to think PP is unreliable. There being, apparently, no 
good reasons, PP is Jnw· 
At this point Alston refers the reader to Thomas Reid' s work. 
Reid suggests that the Creator endows human beings with a strong 
tendency to trust their belief-forming practices, noting that no 
practice can be provided noncircular reasons for accepting it as reli­
able. Thus, if we "are to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, 
we must simply go along with our natural reactions of trust with 
respect to at least some basic sources of belief, provided we lack 
sufficient reason for regarding them as unreliable. "11 Furthermore, 
any appeal to one or another of those practices as more basic than 
the others, with the goal in mind of justifying the less basic by the 
more basic, is illegitimate. We have no reason to single out, for 
example, the practice delivering self-evident beliefs as providing 
more accurate access to truth than PP. D escartes' s strategy of pick­
ing out one practice and using it to justify others is arbitrary. 12 PP 
is Jnw and this, Alston claims, gives us at least some chance at 
knowledge about the physical world. 
4· The Justification of Christian Practice 
D oes CP have the same kind of justification as PP? Is CP Jnw? By 
the nature of the case, one need not produce some set of reasons to 
show that CP is Jnw· Nevertheless, CP is often not accepted as Jnw • 
so some kind of account can be helpful. The best that can be done 
is to present PP, which we accept as Jnw •  alongside CP in order to 
compare the two. If there are no differences signifi cant vis-a-vis 
epistemic justification, then if one accepts PP as Jnw one can accept 
CP as Jnw· 13 Alston argues that there are no such differences and in 
effect, therefore, argues for the truth of PTA . 
I I. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II9. 
I2. Alston does not wish to suggest that one cannot check what might be called 
"subpractices" by a larger practice in which a subpractice is embedded. One might, 
for example, check the reliability of a thermometer by the larger perceptual prac­
tice. 
I 3. One might think there is some sort of argument from analogy here, but I do 
not think this is the case. Alston's comparision is merely a comparision; it is not 
intended as an argument from the justification of one practice to the justification of 
another. 
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Epistemic situations are often analyzed in the following way. In­
stead of having empirical information plain and simpl e, it appears 
that what we have is, on the one hand, a datum such as "I am 
being appeared to in a computerish way" or "I seem to see a com­
puter" or "A computerish sense datum is in my visual field" and, 
on the other hand, bel iefs such as that there is a computer in front 
of me. How does one l egitimately move from the content of one' s 
mental l ife to a claim about the (independently) existing physical 
real ity? Supposedly, the (independently existing) computer gen­
erates the datum via some psychophysical process. Thus the em­
pirical claim, "There is a computer in front of me, " is a hybrid 
resul ting from the datum and an expl anation (via the mysterious 
psychophysical process). But now we are in the difficul t  position 
with PP of having a bifurcation between experience and expl a­
nation. Simil arly with CP, the suggestion goes. One has certain 
kinds of experience, such as it seeming to one that God cares for 
us, and theological expl anations, such as that God does care for us. 
How is one to overcome either of these bifurcations? 
Alston registers his skepticism about the two standard ways by 
which phil osophers attempt to overcome the bifurcation for PP. 
Some try to show that the existence of the physical world is the 
best expl anation of the data we have. But, says Alston, it is un­
l ikely that one can "specify the purely subjective experiential data 
to be explained without relying on the 'independent physical 
world' scheme in doing so, " and thus the expl anation route seems 
closed. 14 Neither does the phenomenal ist approach of taking physi­
cal object bel iefs to be bel iefs about actual and possible  sense expe­
rience fare well , according to Alston. The best move is to reject the 
bifurcation al together and seek to justify the claim that we are in 
direct contact with the objects of the physical world. He suggests a 
parallel strategy for CP: 
The question concerns the justifiability of a certain practice-the 
practice of forming physical-object beliefs directly on the basis of 
perception rather than as an explanation of what is perceived or ex­
perienced. Another way of characterizing the practice in q uestion is 
to say that it is a practice of using a certain conceptual scheme (the 
"independently existing physical object" conceptual scheme) to spe­
cify what it is we are experiencing in sense perception. If I may use 
14. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 109. 
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the term "objectification" for "taking an experience to be an experi­
ence of something of a certain sort," then we may say that the prac­
tice in question is a certain kind of objectification of sense experi­
ence, an objectification in terms of independently existing physical 
objects. Let us use the term "perceptual practice" (PP ) for our famil­
iar way of objectifying sense experience. In parallel fashion I will 
... use the term "Christian practice" (CP ) for the practice of objec­
tifying certain ranges of experience in terms of Christian theology. 15 
In the case of PP, the experience is taken to be an  experience of the 
object itself and not merely a psychologica l datum. Alston a lso 
says the believer takes himself to be directly aware of the object; he 
does not cla im that the subject is directly aware. Further, Alston 
suggests tha t  we should understand our formation of physica l ob­
ject beliefs simply by our "objectification" of a range of experience 
in terms of certa in concepts. On his suggestion, the datum of the 
experience generating physica l  object beliefs is not expla ined by 
reference to objective entities but is simply understood as a n  expe­
rience of those entities. 
A brief detour is necessa ry here. In "Christian Experience and 
Christia n Belief' Alston uses the language of one' s ta king an  expe­
rience to be an  experience of a certa in sort as opposed to the cla im 
that  one's experience is of a certa in sort. In his more fully orbed 
theory of perception, however, he makes the following cla ims: 
As I see the matter, at the heart of perception (sensory and other­
wise ) is a phenomenon variously termed presentation, appearance, or 
givenness. Something is presented to one's experience (awareness ) as 
so-and-so, as blue, as acrid, as a house, as Susie's house, or what­
ever. I take this phenomenon of presentation to be essentially inde­
pendent of conceptualisation, belief, judgment, "taking," or any 
other cognitive activity involving concepts and propositions. It is 
possible, in principle, for this book to visually present itself to me as 
blue even if I do not take it to be blue, think of it as blue, concep­
tualise it as blue, judge it to be blue, or anything else of the sort. 
Thus Alston distances his theory of perception from those in which 
the object of the experience is sa id itself to be constituted in part or 
in whole by the conceptual fra mework and beliefs of the perceiver. 
15. Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, Alston's claims about presentation do not really af­
fect his claims about PP and CP. In fact, Alston goes on to say: 
"No doubt, in mature human perception this element of presenta­
tion is intimately inter twined with conceptualisation and belief, but 
presentation does not consist in anything like that. " So, although 
Alston holds that the object of perception is a given, one' s concep­
tual scheme can nevertheless influence how one takes the given: 
It is essential not to confuse what appears with what it appears as. 
My conceptualised knowledge and belief can affect the latter but not 
the former. If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to one in a 
certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it 
would appear that we can enunciate no further conceptually neces­
sary conditions for perception. But that does not follow. In declar­
ing the concept of appearance (presentation) to be unanalyzable I 
was merely denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent for­
mulation in other terms; I was not denying that conceptually neces­
sary conditions can be formulated in other terms. 
Alston' s realism about the given should not be confused with the 
suggestion that the given itself is all that is necessary  for per ceptual 
exper ience. 16 
Let us return  now to consider PP. Alston' s point is that the data 
of the experiences generating physical object beliefs are not ex­
plained by reference to objective entities but rather such experi­
ences are simply understood as experiences of those entities. So it 
goes with CP as well. Alston is careful to distinguish between "ex­
periences in which the subject takes himself to be directly aware of 
God" and other interesting cases in which someone is "simply . . .  
disposed to believe . . .  that what is happening in his experience is 
to be explained by God' s activity. "17 How does the account of these 
experiences go? As we have lear ned, Alston uses the term "objec­
tify" to stand for "taking a cer tain kind of exper ience as an experi­
ence of something of a cer tain sort. " In the physical object case, we 
take sense experiences as experiences of physical objects (rather 
than psychological data). He suggests, then, that just as we form 
r6. Alston, "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model," paper delivered at the 
Wheaton Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Illinois, October 1989, pp. 2-4. A 
fuller treatment of this topic is found in Alston, Perceiving God, chap. r. 
17. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107. 
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physical object bel iefs directl y  on the basis of perception so we 
form theistic bel iefs directl y  on the basis of theistic experience. 
There is not to be, presumabl y, any inference from the one to the 
other; the formation of bel ief is immediate. Thus, whenever we 
have perceptual experiences, we take ourselves to be in contact 
with physical objects. Just so, whenever we have theistic experi­
ences, we take ourselves to be in contact with God or at least his 
activities. But how are we to understand "theistic experience"? 
Alston says that a certain range of experience is objectified in 
certain terms. What is this range of experience in the real m of 
theistic bel ief? He suggests that there are certain Christian or rel i­
gious experiences that can be objectified. He del imits the experi­
ences about which he is concerned by setting aside what are typ­
ically called mystical experiences-those experiences sometimes 
had by saints and ascetics. He is concerned more with experiences 
open to the typical , lay Christian. 18 He al so sets aside experiences 
that might be described as visions. He does not wish to set aside all 
sensory mediation-for example, seeing the glory of God in the 
mountains. Nevertheless, he l imits his final concern to what we 
might call direct experiences of God. These experiences need not 
be in the forefront of one' s consciousness, but they are not experi­
ences from which one infers the presence of God. God is somehow 
(to be taken as) directly present, just as the tabl e to my l eft is (taken 
by me to be) directly present. 
Given this range of experiences, and Alston' s acc ounts of PP and 
CP, how does the argument for PTA go? Clearly, PP is Jnw· It is 
often suggested, however, that CP is significantly different from 
PP, and these differences show that CP and PP do not have the 
same kind of epistemic justification. Al ston writes: 
I believe that many people are inclined to take CP to be discredited 
by certain ways in which it differs from PP, by the lack of certain 
salient features of PP. The se include the f ollowing: 
I. Within PP there are standard ways of checking the accuracy of 
any particular perceptual belief. If, by looking at a cup, I form the 
18. This remains true even in Perceiving God, where Alston uses the rubric 
"mystical practice" to name the subject of his concern, although at least some of 
his examples in this more recent work are from what is thought of more stan­
dardJY as the mystical literature. Still, his concern is not experiences of unity with 
God but rather with experiences where God is taken to be present, in a sense 
Alston specifies, to the experiencer's consciousness. 
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belief that there is coffee in it, I can check this belief for accuracy by 
smelling or tasting the contents; I can get other observers to look at 
it, smell it, or taste it; I can run chemical tests on it and get other 
people to do so. 
2. By engaging in PP we can discover regularities in the behavior 
of objects putatively observed, and on this basis we can, to a certain 
extent, effectively predict the course of events. 
3· Capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found universally among 
normal adult human beings. 
4· All normal adult human beings, whatever their culture, use 
basically the same conceptual scheme in objectify ing their sense ex­
perience. 19
( 2 I 
Alston responds in both a negative and a pos1t1ve way to these 
supposed disanalogies between PP and CP. Only the negative re­
ply need concern us for the present. 
The conclusion of the negative reply is that PP's possession of 
features I-4 is best seen "as a rather special situation that pertains 
specifically to certain fundamental aspects of that particular practice 
in this particular historical-cultural situation rather than as an in­
stance of what is to be expected of any reliable epistemic practice. "20 
Alston's argument is roughly that although I-4 are features that 
one might desire to have attached to an epistemic practice, it does 
not follow that a practice's failing to have them is a reason to reject 
the practice's claim to reliability. In fact, PP's possession of I-4 
does not give us a reason to take PP as reliable. 
To simplify matters, let us consider features 1 and 2 together and 
then 3 and 4· Features I and 2 have the common focus of calling 
attention to predictability, whereas 3 and 4 have the common focus 
of calling attention to the universal human participation in the 
practice. 21 So first, I and 2. PP is what Alston calls a "basic prac­
tice." It is a practice that "constitutes our basic access to its subject 
matter. We can learn about our physical environment only by per­
ceiving it, by receiving reports of the perceptions of others, and by 
carrying out inferences from what we learn in these first two ways. 
We can not know anything a priori about these matters, nor do we 
19. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 121. 
20. Ibid., p. 128. 
21. This observation is made by Peter Van lnwagen in the abstract "Abnormal 
Experience and Abnormal Belief," Nous 15 (1981): 13-14. 
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have any other sort of experiential access to the physical world. " 
Thus, if one tries to take features I and 2 as reasons for judging PP 
to be reliable, one is involved in a "vicious circularity. "22 So no 
adequate reason can be given. 
As an alternative, Alston suggests that, although I and 2 do not 
provide us with reasons for the reliability of PP, perhaps they be­
token or manifest reliability. Thus, the first part of the anti-CP 
charge reduces to the claim that I and 2 manifest reliability but that 
CP lacks I and 2. Their absence is supposed to be a reason to reject 
the reliability of CP. But surely it is not. If I and 2 are not neces­
sary conditions for reliability, as Alston argues, then the only alter­
native left for the anti-CP challenge is that I and 2 are general 
features of reliability, features such that the absence thereof pro­
vides at least prima facie reason to reject a practice as not reliable. 
In response, Alston offers one central reason why we should not 
think I and 2 are general features of reliable practices. This reason 
is hinted at by the practice of pure mathematics. The practice of 
pure mathematics does not allow for predictability precisely be­
cause it does not deal with changing objects. This example indi­
cates that "whether a practice could be expected to yield predic­
tion, if reliable, depends on the kind of subject matter with which 
it deals. "23 He then suggests that it is only accidental and not neces­
sary to PP that predictability is built into it. 
As for features 3 and 4, not everyone engages in the practice of 
pure mathematics, so the claim that everyone engages in the same 
epistemic practices is not true; universal participation need not be a 
feature of a reliable practice. Also, it is not at all clear that all peo­
ple of various cultures objectify experience in the way Western 
people do. Alston admits that this is a controversial area, but since 
the issue is unclear and, I might add, not even clearly decidable, 
perhaps it should not be pressed on either side. 
Given these considerations, although the presence of features I-
4 may be cognitive desiderata, their absence does not give us a 
reason to reject the reliability of a practice failing to have them. PP 
and CP thus have, according to Alston, the same kind of epistemic 
22. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. I 17, 124. 
23. Ibid., p. 127. 
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justification, Jnw· Just as we have no reason to reject the reliability 
of PP, so we have no reason to reject the reliability of CP. 
5· Alstonian Theistic Experience 
In the next section I introduce a challenge to PTA which I draw 
from some recent philosophical work on the epistemic value of 
mystical experiences. To develop the challenge, however, I need a 
clearer explanation of Alston's account of experience. Experience, 
whether in PP or CP, is such that the object of one's experience is 
taken to be directly present. Alston resists any bifurcation of one's 
belief formation into parts, claiming that one simply takes one's 
experience to be of a certain object; one objectifies one's experience 
immediately into the categories appropriate to that experience. 
Sense experiences are objectified into phy sical object beliefs via the 
independently existing physical object scheme. Theistic experi­
ences are objectified into theistic beliefs via the (Christian) theo­
logical object scheme. How should one understand the experiences 
that the theist objectifi es into theistic belief? 
Since the belief formation is noninferential, one expects the con­
tent of the experience to be relevant to the content of the belief. 
But what is the content of the experience? Here there appears to be 
a certain looseness in Alston's presentation in "Christian Experi­
ence and Christian Belief." Although he indicates early in his essay 
that he does not want to rule out experiences in which one might 
see the glory of God in majestic natural scenes or hear God speak 
in the words of a friend, he later specifies that he is restricting 
himself 
to experiences in which the subject takes himself to be directly 
aware of God, rather than simply being disposed to believe, how­
ever firmly, that what is happening in his experience is to be ex­
plained by God's activity. Thus if after responding to the Gospel 
message, I find myself reacting to people in a different kind of way, 
I may firmly believe that this is due to the action of the Holy Spirit 
on my soul; but if I do not seem to myself to be directly experienc­
ing the presence of the Holy Spirit, if I am not disposed to answer 
the question "Just what did you experience?" or "Just what were 
you aware of?" with something that begins "The Holy Spirit .. . , " 
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then this experience does not fall within our purview . . . .  No 
doubt, this is often a difficult distinction to make. 24 
The first examples indicate a certain overlap in experience be­
tween theist and nontheist. For example, presumably both theist 
and nontheist (can) see the natural scene and both (can) hear the 
voice of the friend. In the remaining example, the nontheist pre­
sumably does not react to people in a way different than before 
hearing the gospel. This is an experience to which the nontheist has 
no access. The question is whether Alston can include both kinds 
of example-those in which there is an overlap of experience be­
tween theist and nontheist and those in which there is no overlap. 
In the cases in which a theist and a nontheist appear to be having 
the same experience-viewing the beautiful mountains-but 
where only the theist forms the belief that God made them or that 
they reveal the glory of God, it may appear that there is an experi­
ential overlap. But I think this is not the case. Insofar as Alston's 
suggestions go, it seems that there must be two separate experien­
tial contents, for if the experiential contents were the same for both 
theist and nontheist then the difference in beliefs would need to be 
explained either by a difference in inference and explanation added 
to the experience or by the nontheist's failure to have a theistic 
conceptual or belief framework. An inferential addition is not al­
lowed by Alston's own case; the objectification is to be immediate. 
And the failure of the nontheist to have the theistic conceptual or 
belief framework seems at best an unlikely explanation. Presum­
ably both theist and nontheist take the mountains to be present in 
Alston's objectification sense. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
theist confuses the presence of mountains with the presence of 
God. Even if the theist has some theistic conceptual or belief 
framework the nontheist lacks, the theist needs some additional 
(and different) content in her experience to objectify it legitimately 
in theistic terms. It seems at least prima facie clear that the content 
of the experience should be related to the content of the belief gen­
erated. Just as I would deny , under normal circumstances, that 
there is a tree in front of me while I am in a room with no view of 
trees (i.e., while not having any experiences whose content in-
24. Ibid., pp. 107-8. 
Alston's Parity Thesis 
eludes what I take to be a tree), so the theist should deny, under 
normal circumstances, that she is in direct contact with God while 
not having an experience the content of which she takes to be 
theistic. The mere presence of mountains and a theistic framework 
is not enough for the generation of a justified theistic belief. 
Some comments from Perceiving God can help us here. Alston 
writes: 
What distinguishes perception from abstract thought is that the ob­
ject is directly presented or immediately present to the subject so that 
"indirect presentation" would be a contradiction in terms. To tease 
out a concept of directness that has an opposite within the_ category 
of presentation, let's go back to sense perception .... We can distin­
guish directly seeing someone from seeing her in a mirror or on tele­
vision. We have presentation on both sides of this distinction. Even 
when I see someone in a mirror or on television, the person appears 
to me as such-and-such, as smiling, tall, or smartly dressed. That 
person can be identified with an item in my visual field. This con­
trasts with the case in which I take something as a sign or indication 
of X but do not see X itself (X does not appear anywhere within my 
visual field), as when I take a vapor trail across the sky as an indica­
tion that a jet plane has flown by. Here I don't see the plane at all; 
nothing in my visual field looks like a plane. Let's call this latter 
kind of case indirect perceptional recognition, and the former kind (see­
ing someone on television) indirect perception. We can then say that 
indirect is distinguished from direct perception of X by the fact that 
in the former, but not in the latter, we perceive X by virtue of 
perceiving something else, Y. In the indirect cases I see the person, 
T, by virtue of seeing a mirror or the television screen or whatever. 
On the other hand, when I see T face to face there is nothing else I 
perceive by virtue of perceiving which I see T. 25 
Here Alston distinguishes between direct and indirect perception. 
How do the two kinds of examples I noted from "Christian Expe­
rience and Christian Belief' fit into the scheme from Perceiving 
God? Alston says in Perceiving God that he once thought cases of 
indirect perception and indirect perceptual recognition could not be 
distinguished, as far as the object of the perception (or recognition) 
was God. This indicates that when he wrote "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief' he meant to focus only on direct experiences. 
25. Alston, Perceiving God, pp. 2o-21. 
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But Alston also tells us in the later work that some seminar stu­
dents convinced him that, if God could appear to him as loving or 
powerful or glorious when he is not sensorily aware of a field of 
oats (or whatever), then God could appear to him as loving or 
powerful or glorious when that comes through his sense percep­
tion of the field of oats. Alston continues by noting that he has 
nothing to say against this possibility. 26 
What is of importance here is that Alston now thinks that cases 
in which God appears through something else, rather than directly, 
can be classified as cases of indirect perception and need not be 
classified as cases of indirect perceptual recognition. Nevertheless, 
he makes it clear that his focus in Perceiving God is the possibility of 
direct perception of God rather than the more complicated indirect 
perception. His reason is that the former is a simpler phenomenon 
than the later. Given this historical information, I believe it is safe 
to suggest that Alston' s examples of experiencing God when hear­
ing a friend' s voice or seeing a natural scene are best understood as 
cases of indirect perception and that we are therefore right here to 
understand Alston' s main concern to be the direct type of experi­
ence of God. But we also learn that my way of passing over the 
more complex cases of indirect perception of God may be too 
easy. Perhaps there is something more going on in cases in which 
one experiences God through hearing a friend' s voice or a beautiful 
scene than some kind of inference or explanation added to the ex­
perience.27 
One way of spelling out Alston' s notion of direct experience 
is the following. 28 Suppose Alston is right and we do objectify 
26. Ibid., p. 28. 
27. I have more to say on this in Chapters 6 and 7, for I take Plantinga's exam­
ples of experiencing God to be of this type, rather than the direct type. In short, I 
attempt later to do some of the work on the more complex cases of indirect per­
ception which are not Alston's focus. 
28. Alston goes into some detail in accounting for various levels of immediacy 
of perception in Perceiving God. He sums up his position by noting three grades of 
immediacy: "(A) Absolute immediacy. One is aware of X but not through any­
thing else, even a state of consciousness. (B) Mediated immediacy (direct percep­
tion). One is aware of X through a state of consciousness that is distinguishable 
from X, and can be made an object of absolutely immediate awareness, but is not 
perceived. (C) Mediate perception. One is aware of X through the awareness of 
another object of perception" (pp. 21-22). (A) is exemplified by awareness of a 
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our experiences. He seems to have in mind a range of experience 
united by some commonality; for example, in the physical object 
case it is sensory experience that is common and, it seems, in the 
theistic case the commonality is a sort of "theistic sense. " Although 
Alston does not explicitly take note of it in "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief, " on analysis it appears that there is a kind of 
link between sense perceptual experiences and physical object be­
liefs, for example, between "I am appeared to treely" and "I see a 
tree. " 29 This link need not and perhaps cannot be one of belief, at 
least insofar as beliefs generate inferential beliefs, but there is a link 
of the following sort. No one forming the belief "I see a tree" 
would deny that she is being appeared to treely. The link is a sort 
of linguistic or conceptual one. 
Now, according to Alston's claims in "Experience of God: A 
Perceptual Model" and in Perceiving God, the given in an experi­
ence is not dependent on the perceiver's concepts or beliefs. Thus 
caution is called for here. This linguistic-conceptual link to which I 
am calling attention need not imply an antirealist theory of percep­
tion or, for that matter, an antirealist metaphysic. Alston may be 
right that in principle a tree may be present to me even if I do not 
take it to be a tree, think of it as a tree, conceptualize it as a tree, 
judge it to be a tree, or anything else of the sort. Nevertheless, it 
seems true enough that, if I form the belief that I see a tree, I will 
not deny that I am appeared to treely. 30 Thus, in distinguishing be­
tween direct experiences and experiences of other kinds it is helpful 
state of consciousness. (B) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan as he comes 
within one's perceptual range. (C) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan's im­
age on the television screen. I believe that what I have to say in the main text 
provides one account of direct experience that could be spelled out in terms of 
mediated immediacy or direct perception. 
29. He does note the difficulty in specifying purely subjective experiences with­
out reference to "schemes" in doing so; see "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief," p. 109. 
30. A brief explanation of the terminology used in this context may be in order. 
In this case, the "adverbial" construction is intended to call attention to the linguis­
tic nature of the link without committing me to any existence claims. In its 
broader use in epistemology, the point is to emphasize how I am appeared to rather 
than how things appear to me; see Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2d ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 29-30, for a more detailed ex­
planation of this terminology. 
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to note that one can appeal to the language used to describe the 
content of direct experiences. 31 It is a language relying on the phys­
ical object conceptual scheme itself. If I take myself to see a tree 
and go on to describe the experience underlying the formation of 
the corresponding belief ("I see a tree" ), I use language such as "I 
am appeared to treely. " The description of the experience makes 
covert reference to the tree or, to make the point more general, to 
the physical object. Let us give this link the name "lingo-concep­
tual link. " 
Now, one might suggest that there need not be a lingo-concep­
tual link. For example, the experience could be described in terms 
of patches of greenishness falling into certain patterns or having a 
certain shape. But this seems an unlikely account. Our experience 
is gestaltlike and does not seem reducible to the more basic compo­
nents. At least, when asked why one thinks she sees a tree the reply 
is something like "I am appeared to treely" and the account is not 
typically given further analysis. 
If there is a range of experiences picked out by the terms "theis­
tic experience" or "Christian experience" (understood as direct ex­
perience), one might surmise that the existence of a similar link can 
be discovered in theistic belief formation. When the belief "God 
wants me to love people more fully" is formed, the description of 
the experience underlying it would, one might expect, make co­
vert reference to theistic language-"being appeared to theistically. " 
Thus the range of experiences to which Alston can point, given the 
objectification scheme he describes, seems not to overlap in con­
tent with the experiences of the nontheist. 32 Alston' s suggestions 
seem to rule out understanding his examples as allowing both the­
ists and nontheists to have the same experiential content in their 
3 r. This seems true enough for beliefs expressed by perceptual verbs. But what 
of straight physical object beliefs that might, as Alston suggests, be based on expe­
rience, for example, "Suzie's house needs painting"? The link here is perhaps not as 
direct, but there still is one. If my belief that Suzie's house needs painting is based 
in experience, I must be looking at (or have looked at) Suzie's house. So "Suzie's 
house needs painting" is linked to "I see (saw) Suzie's house needing paint," which 
in tum is linked to "I am (was) appeared to in a Suzie's house-needing-paint-like 
manner." 
32. Whether it is best to describe such experiences as one experience with two 
contents or as two experiences, one of which occurs at the same time as the other, 
is not important here. 
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experiences. So the experiences objectified by theists into theistic 
belief are experiences only the theist has- or, at least if had by a 
nontheist, they are ignored, explained away, or otherwise not ob­
jectified. 
6. A Challenge to the Alstonian Parity Thesis 
Two sorts of questions can be distinguished in a consideration of 
perception-like theistic experiences. The first is whether the experi­
ence is veridical as opposed to hallucinatory. The second is what 
the experience (whether veridical or hallucinatory) is an experience 
of, what the object of the experience is. The second question is 
relevant here. 
In an essay on mysticism, J. William Forgie isolates the phenom­
enological content of the experience from other background beliefs 
and "items of knowledge" which he calls the "epistemic base. " 
When seeking to identify a person one sees, he argues, one must 
make reference to the epistemic base. For example, to identify the 
young man next door when one knows that identical twins Tom 
and Tim Tibbetts both live there, one must rely on other back­
ground information such as the fact that Tom is out of town this 
week. Since experiences of both Tom and Tim Tibbetts are phe­
nomenologically the same, knowing Tom is out of town allows 
one to identify this young man as Tim Tibbetts. Thus a purely 
phenomenological description of the experience could not take the 
form "It was an experience of Tim Tibbetts." Such a description 
must rely on the epistemic base. There is nothing in the phenome­
nological experience that guarantees that this is an experience of 
Tim rather than Tom, "or for that matter any of a number of other 
things- a third 'look-alike, ' an appropriately made-up dummy, 
or even a cleverly devised hologram- an accurate perception of 
which could be phenomenologically indistinguishable from the ex­
perience in question. "33 
To show that no experience can be phenomenologically an expe­
rience of God-that is, to show that "it's of God" cannot be a true 
phenomenological description of any experience-Forgie employs 
33. J. William Forgie, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity," 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion I 5 (1984): 13-30, quotation p. 14. 
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a "divide and conquer" strat egy. "God " can be understood to be 
either a (disguised) de finit e d es cri ption or a proper name: 
If it is a proper name, then if an experience is to be phenome­
nologically of God, the content of the experience must guarantee 
that its object is a certain unique individual, the one named by 
"God, " and not any other. It must not be possible, that is, for the 
experience to constitute an accurate "perception" of some individual 
other than God . . . .  On the other hand, if "God" is a description, 
meaning (let us suppose ) "the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good 
creator of the heavens and the earth, " then a theistic experience need 
only be phenomenologically of some individual or other-it doesn't 
matter which one-who satisfies that description. In this case it is 
required only that it not be possible that the experience constitute an 
accurate perception of something that fails to satisfy the description. 34 
The first option, taking "God" to be a proper name, d oes not 
provid e an account of how one could have a phenomenological 
experience that guarantees that it is an experience of God. For such 
a guarantee to be possible, one would have to identify the object of 
the experienc e as having what Forgie calls a "uniquely instantiable 
property [UIP]." The only likely candidates for such pro pe rt ies are 
those such as "being Socrates" or, in the t heistic cas e, "being 
God. " But neither of these properties is giv en as part of a phenom­
enol ogical e xpe rience itself, just as it is not given in the experi ence 
of the young man next door that he is Tim rather than Tom Tib­
bet ts. F orgie says that the point about sense experience can be put 
in two ways: 
(r) At best sense experiences are phenomenologically of things 
that appear in a certain way, but since properties of the form "being 
something that looks (sounds, feels, etc. )-or is capable of looking 
(etc. )-this way" are not UIPs, sense experiences are not phenome­
nologically of individuals. 
(2) If a sense experience is to be phenomenologically of an indi­
vidual, it is not enough that that individual have a UIP. It must have 
a UIP of the form "being something which appears-or which is 
capable of appearing-in a certain way. " It is because no object of 
sense experience seems to have a UIP of that form that no sense 
experience is phenomenologically of an individual. 
34. Ibid., p. 16. 
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Forgie admits that if mystical (theistic) experiences are radically un­
like perceptual experiences then perhaps his argument is not rele­
vant. Nevertheless, insofar as the analogy is accurate his point 
seems to stand. Forgie also admits that he cannot provide an argu­
ment to conclude that there are no UIPs of the sort in question. 
Nevertheless, it seems at least unlikely that such UIPs are in the 
offing given the following intuition: for any allegedly phenome­
nological experience of God, there is a possible world in which 
"the causal laws pertaining to the relations between possible objects 
of 'perception' and the 'perceivers' of those objects are such that 
some individual, not identical to God, is capable of appearing in 
just the way displayed in the experience in question." In short, if 
"God" is a proper name, then experiences that phenomenologically 
guarantee that their object is God are not possible. 35 
The second possibility, taking "God" to be a disguised definite 
description, fares no better. What is needed here for a phenome­
nological experience to guarantee itself as an experience of God is 
not that it be an experience of an individual but only that it be of 
something having certain properties. In God' s case the properties 
could be all-knowing, all-powerful, and so forth. Forgie first 
makes the Humean observation that causation, whether of one 
event causing another or of some agent causing some event or 
some substance, is not phenomenologically in the experience. If 
this is true, then there are difficulties with the suggestion that any­
one could recognize something as having certain properties having 
to do with powers or beliefs- all-powerful, all-knowing, and so 
forth. Whether the properties have to do with powers or belief, 
ultimately one's recognition of them depends on recognition of 
causal relations: 
The best candidate for an experience which is phenomenologically 
of something having certain powers and beliefs is one which is phe­
nomenologically of something manifesting those powers or expres­
sing those beliefs. I f  there can be no experience which is phenome­
nologically of some power, or some belief, by itself, ... perhaps an 
experience can be phenomenologically of something manifesting a 
power or expressing a belief. I f  so, then an experience itself could 
guarantee that its object is something manifesting, and hence pos-
35. Ibid., p. r8. 
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sessing, that power, and also something expressing, and so having, 
that belief. But here is where the earlier point about causation is 
important. If causation is not phenomenologically presentable then 
neither is agency. If some agent is manifesting a power or expres­
sing a belief, that agent is causing something to happen, producing 
some state of affairs. But if no experience is phenomenologically of 
someone's causing or producing a state of affairs (as opposed to that 
state of affairs simply co-existing with the agent or coming into 
existence while the agent is present ),  then no experience will be phe­
nomenologically of someone manifesting a power or expressing a 
belief. So the best candidate for an experience which is phenome­
nologically of something having certain powers or beliefs turns out 
not to be up to the job. 36 
The ge ne ra l point is that there i s  nothi ng in  the phenomenologica l 
aspect of the experience a lone tha t  enti tles the perceiver to claim 
tha t  i t  i s  an e xpe rience of God, whether "God" i s  understood to be 
a disguised definite description or a proper na me . 
Based on the kinds of suggestion s Forgie  makes, I propose the 
followi ng cha llenge to PTA. PP a nd CP do not have the same 
strength of e piste mic justification, si nce CP, unlike PP, requires 
a role for background beliefs for the gen eration and jus tifica ti on 
of i ts delivera nces. This specia l role for CP' s ba ckground beli efs 
weakens the level of strength of justi fica tion for CP-generated be­
li efs. This is not to say that beli efs delivered by CP are not justi­
fied, nor even that they a re not Jn· Nevert he les s, they are not as 
st ro ngly justified a s  PP-delivered beli efs. Ca ll this  the "ba ckground 
be lief cha llenge . "  
Thi s  cha llen ge suggests that, insofar a s  Alston mea ns for his a c­
count of belief formation to be a n  a ccount of noninferentia l belief 
formation in volvin g only a n  objectification of e xperien ce, then 
perhaps there i s  a need for more clari ty about the notions of "non­
inferential" and "objectification" to which Alston a ppea ls . Theistic  
beli efs a ppear to depend in  some way on a set of ba ckground be­
liefs. The ba ckground belief challenge suggests that  any ti me one 
forms a G ustified) belief about an  individua l qua epistemically iden­
tifiable individual (as well, I think, as  about an  individua l' s  action 
qua uniquely attri buta ble to tha t  individua l), the belief is inferentia l 
or i nterpretive; or at  lea st, i f  noninferentia l, i t  relies in some epi -
36. Ibid., pp. 20-21 .  
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stemical ly significant way on backgrou nd beliefs as opposed to re­
ly ing merely on the application of a conceptu al scheme. 37 I argue 
below that some of ou r doxastic practices do indeed involve an 
epistemically significant place for backgrou nd beliefs, but where 
the background beliefs do not form an inferential basis for the be­
lief generated. 
A second issu e arises in connection with the backgrou nd belief 
challenge. Let u s  grant that CP does involve backgrou nd beliefs. Is 
the same not tru e for the generation of PP beliefs? And if so, are 
not the teeth of the challenge removed? Alston himself presents 
several way s in which backgrou nd beliefs may enter into PP. I 
argue in Chapter 3 that there is a special position for backgrou nd 
beliefs in CP that PP does not requ ire, thu s defending the chal­
lenge. But first there are distinctions and observations to be made. 
In most of ou r waking hours, we find ou rselves engaged in PP. 
The beliefs it generates tou ch mu ch of what we believe in general 
and virtually all we believe abou t the physical world and its furni­
tu re. PP delivers beliefs abou t all kinds of physical objects: hou ses, 
rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, compu ters, and sweet pota­
toes, to name only a minu scule number. It also delivers beliefs 
abou t particu lar hou ses, rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, and 
sweet potatoes. In many cases, the beliefs generated by PP come 
and go, and the objects we form beliefs abou t are not important 
enou gh for us  to name or otherwise identify so as to be able to 
reidentify them. For example, if I am in a new city , being driven 
throu gh its streets, PP may lead me to believe all sorts of things 
abou t the new physical environment in which I find myself. For 
the most part, however, I do not pay enough attention so that later 
I might be able to sort out one hou se from another, as far as my 
beliefs abou t them are concerned. Unless, in short, there is some­
thing spectacu lar abou t a given physical scene or u nless I have 
some specifi c reason or need to remember information abou t a 
given bit of the phy sical environment, I simply do not form beliefs 
abou t objects which are focu sed on allowing me to reidentify the 
object. Still, I may be forming many beliefs via PP as I drive 
37· Alston himself allows for the possibility of mediate or indirect justification 
of beliefs by their relation to other beliefs. And not all these need be inferential. See 
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 101. 
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aroun d the city, an d these beliefs classify the objects of my experi­
ence into kin ds of things with certain properties not shared with 
any others. 
What I wish to emphasize is not the classificatory type of belief 
just noted but what I call "epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs" 
(where it is the object of the belief that is in dividual, not the be­
liefs). I mean by the term "epistemically unique individual" n ot 
simply one of a kin d but on e of a kin d with certain unshared prop­
erties an d identifiable an d reidentifiable as such. CP delivers beliefs 
about such an object. The focus of CP is only one kin d  of thing, a 
divin e en tity. An d CP delivers beliefs about the only member of its 
kin d, God. 38 (Note the promin ent place of discussion of proper 
n ames an d definite description s  in Forgie' s argument.) The central­
ity in CP of a unique in dividual who is (taken to be) identifiable 
an d reidentifiable is dear. But not on ly is he central, the entire 
epistemic practice is oriented toward forming beliefs about this sin ­
gle in dividuaP9 
This is quite different from PP, where beliefs are gen erated 
willy-nilly about coun tless thin gs (an d even countless kin ds of 
thin gs), many of which we do not bother to identify as the un ique 
in dividuals they are but rather only classify as members of a certain 
kind. Contrast "I see the white rock next to the oak in my front 
yard" with "I see a rock." The latter can be un derstood merely to 
classify the object of my experience as being a member of a certain 
kin d or, in so doing, to attribute certain properties to the object. 
The former picks out the object of my experience as the in dividual 
rock it is-the white on e beside the oak in my front yard. Pre­
sumably, beliefs generated by CP are closer to the latter than to the 
former, that is, closer to epistemically unique in dividual beliefs 
than to classificatory beliefs. One reason for this may simply be 
that there is on ly on e divin e in dividual, God. 40 
38. God may not be the member of a kind; if he is not, then CP does not deliver 
beliefs about any kind of thing, but about a very special thing. 
39. This is not to say that no other individual would ever play a role in CP. I 
might sense that God wants me to love my wife more, for example. The point is 
that God is the focal point of CP. 
40. Even in classificatory beliefs one is classifying a unique individual as a rock, 
tree, or something else. But the point is the focus or emphasis of the beliefs con­
tent, not simply the object of the belie£ 
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There i s  much more to say about this  di fference between PP and 
CP, but for now we can merely introduce the i ssues that are the 
focus not only of the discussion of PTA but of the challenge to 
Reformed epistemology's emphasis on pari ty in  general. The dif­
ference between CP and PP is that the former i s  solely ori ented 
toward beliefs about an epistemically unique individual, the latter 
i s  not so ori ented. This di fference requires, in  turn, a special epi­
stemic role (yet to be fully specified) for background beliefs in  the 
generation of CP's deliverances. Thi s special place for background 
beli efs i s  absent in  the generation of a good many, i f  not all, of 
PP's deliverances. D o  background beli efs have a special position in  
CP that they do not have in  PP, and i f  so, i s  this  position epi­
stemi cally important? I tackle these questions in  reverse order , 
postponing a full inquiry into the former question unti l the next 
chapter. For now, let me assume an affir mative answer to the first 
question and go on to discuss an answer to the second. 
Let us assume that PP and CP differ on the place of background 
beliefs i n  the generati on of G ustified) beli efs. As a prelimi nary run 
toward getting at the suspi cion that the di ffering roles of back­
ground beliefs are epistemi cally important, let us distinguish be­
tween three kinds of belief formation. The first i s  that of Alston's 
objecti fication; these beli efs are the result of a lingo-conceptual 
scheme alone being applied noni nferentially to experience. Let us 
call these "conceptual-reading beli efs" and their corresponding 
practices "conceptual-reading practices. " The second kind are those 
beliefs formed inferentially; these beli efs are the result of conscious, 
di scursive (deductive, inductive, or i nterpretive) reasoning. Let us 
call these "i nferential beliefs" and their corresponding practi ces "in­
ferential pr actices. " The third kind is  noninferential but where 
something more than concepts are appli ed to experience; concepts 
and substantive beliefs are appli ed, albeit  noni nferentially, to expe­
rience. One's epistemic base includes background informati on (in 
the form of beli efs) that i s  used, along with concepts, to generate 
beli efs. Let us call these "noninferential medi ated beli efs" and the 
corresponding practices "noninferential mediated practi ces. " 
Although we can allow that all these modes of belief generation 
can provide us with justified beliefs, i t  might sti ll be the case that 
conceptual-readi ng beli efs have a privi leged posi tion. We are, in 
fact, attracted to these noninferential, merely conceptually read be-
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l iefs. We give them a special place in our epistemic hierarchies. The 
reason for this is a kind of Cartesian worry about inferences or 
interpretations. Conceptual-reading bel iefs simpl y  have the l east 
chance of going astray. In cases of inference, the longer and more 
compl icated the reasoning, the more l ikely  one is led down the 
epistemic garden path. One thus suspects that, even where the rea­
soning is not inferential or even conscious, the more compl icated 
the intell ectual moves, the more l ikely one is to go astray. Further­
more, the bel iefs required for the inferences and interpretations of­
ten, perhaps always, themselves need justification. Should we not 
suspect that any bel iefs required for Alston' s CP objectifications 
also need to be justified (or have justification), whereas our basic 
conceptual schemes, as used in PP, do not? What then of the non­
inferential mediated bel iefs? I suspect that these are in a sort of 
hal fway house between conceptual-reading and inferential bel iefs. 
The epistemic justification for noninferential mediated beliefs, al ­
though not as strong as the justification for conceptual -reading be­
liefs, is not as weak as the justification for inferential bel iefs. N one 
of this is to say that any of these three kinds of bel ief is not justi­
fied; it is only to note a ranking of strengths of justification. 
According to Alston, the objectification of perceptual experience 
via a conceptual scheme does not invol ve discursive reasoning, ex­
planation, interpretation, or any appeal to background bel iefs, at 
least in a l arge number of cases. In contrast to this, as I argue l ater 
(see Chapter 3 , Section 2), forming bel iefs about Tom and Tim 
Tibbetts or God always invol ves at least a noninferential role for 
background bel iefs. The l atter seem to be, once again (see Chapter 
8, Section 1) ,  at least sl ightly  l ess high on the epistemic l adder than 
the former, and bel iefs about epistemically unique individuals  (at 
least where these do not derive from PP)41 therefore do not appear 
to have the same epistemic status as bel iefs formed via Alston's 
objectification. According to PTA the two kinds of bel iefs (percep­
tual and theistic), given appropriate circumstances, not onl y  have 
the same kind of epistemic justification but also the same level or 
strength of that kind. It seems that the justification attached to con­
ceptual -reading bel iefs may be (sl ightly) stronger than that attached 
41. PP can give us beliefs about epistemically unique individuals, but these do 
not require background beliefs .  At least that is what I argue in Chapter J. 
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to noninferential mediated beliefs. But then, if PP provides a non­
inferential conceptual reading of experience whereas CP does not, 
then CP and PP do not share the same epistemic level. And this is 
true even if they share the same kind of justification, namely, Jn· 
Ev en granting this initial description of the two kinds of case, is 
this argument not just a quibble ov er matters of little significance? 
Perhaps beliefs deliv ered v ia noninferential mediated belief genera­
tion are, for all intents and purposes, Jnw· Since Jnw merely de­
mands that there not be reasons to reject the epistemic practice as 
unreliable, discov ering that a practice appeals to background beliefs 
does not show that the practice is not Jnw· The definition of Jnw 
simply makes no reference to how the practices work. Perhaps by 
the letter of the law Alston is correct and PTA is true. Neverthe­
less, the distinctions noted here seem to indicate some need for a 
more finely tuned notion of Jnw and the parity thesis in which it is 
embedded. Are there not further gradations of justification within 
the weak v ersion ofJn? And do these not rely on the internal work­
ings of the practices? Alston himself hints at such a possibility 
when he admits that features 1-4 (those attached to PP but not to 
CP) are "desiderata for an epistemic practice. If we were shaping 
the world to our heart' s desire, I dare say that we would arrange 
for our practices to exhibit these features. . . . T hings go more 
smoothly, more satisfyingly, from a cognitiv e  point of view where 
these features are exhibited. Since PP possesses these v irtues and 
CP does not, the former is, to that extent and in that way, superior 
from a cognitive point of view. "42 
This cognitive superiority does not push PP beyond Jnw· Neither 
does CP' s  lack of it keep CP from being Jnw· In fact, after this 
suggestion Alston goes on to argue that the features that generate 
or allow for this cognitive superiority are not necessary for re­
liability. But surely Alston' s comment indicates the possibility of 
some ranking within Jnw· Within this possibility it is natural to 
suggest that noninferential mediated practices do not share the 
same strength as conceptual-reading practices, at least, one can say, 
from a cognitive point of view. T hus, although PTA is true as a 
general claim, further refinement indicates a ranking within Jnw by 
which CP turns out to be less attractive than PP. Is this lack of 
42. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24. 
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attractiveness more than a cognitive issu e? Is it an epis temic one? I 
have sugges ted an intu itive cas e for its being epis temic bu t have 
not developed the idea fully. Let me s imply s tate here that I believe 
the issu e is an epis temic one becaus e the background beliefs need 
jus tifi cation. 
The issue of whether backgrou nd beliefs need jus tification is an 
important one, bu t I pos tpone a dis cuss ion of it, and some fu rther 
refinements of the notions of conceptu al-reading and noninferential 
mediated practices and beliefs , until Chapters 6 and 7· For now, 
assu ming that that promissory note is su ccess fu lly paid, and that 
PP and CP do in fact differ on the role of backgrou nd beliefs ,  we 
can sugges t  that PTA is , s trictly s peaking, fals e, for there are cogni­
tive and epis temic rankings within Jnw that PTA does not recog­
nize. In the next chapter I argu e  that PP and CP do differ on the 
role of backgrou nd beliefs .  
